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Abstract
Advice is important for decision making, especially in the financial sec-
tor. We investigate how individuals assess risk preferences of others given
sociodemographic information or pictures. Both non-professionals and
financial professionals participate in this artefactual field experiment.
Subjects mainly rely on the other’s self-assessment of risk preferences
and on gender when forming the belief about someone else’s risk prefer-
ences. On average, subjects consider themselves to be more risk-tolerant
than the person they evaluate. Subjects use their own risk attitude as
a reference point for predicting others’ risk preferences. This false con-
sensus effect is less pronounced for young professionals than for senior
and non-professionals. Furthermore, financial professionals predict risk
preferences more accurately compared to non-professionals.
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1 Introduction
Every day, people have to decide among multiple risky options. An important
aspect is that people make a decision not only based on their own knowledge
and experience, but also based on advice. Especially in the financial sector,
products are becoming more and more complex and at the same time, financial
literacy is limited (van Rooij et al. 2011). Thus, individuals are increasingly
relying on professionals - such as financial consultants, insurance agents, but
also doctors in the health domain - when making their decisions (c.f. Allen
2001, Bhattacharya et al. 2012).
An integral determinant of individuals’ decision making are their risk prefer-
ences. Behavior such as financial decisions, smoking and occupational choices
can be predicted by risk preferences (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011).
These developments give rise to the question of whether an advisor is capable
of assessing the risk preferences of an advisee correctly. This is the aim of this
study. We analyze whether good advice is possible if risk preferences are not ob-
vious to the advisor. Explicitly, we abstain from any agency problems on which
the theoretical literature has focused so far (c.f. Ottaviani and Soerensen 2006,
Inderst and Ottaviani (forthcoming) or Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer 1985). Our
objective is to start a step earlier. If the advisor’s only goal is to correctly gauge
the risk preferences of the advisee, is the advisor able to do so?
Advice is usually given by professional advisors. Therefore we employ an arte-
factual field experiment1 in which three types of subjects participate: senior
financial advisors, junior financial advisors and non-professionals. These groups
allow us to explore potential behavioral differences, in particular as the coun-
seling experience differs and sorting of employees into the financial sector could
be an issue (c.f. Bonin et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Haigh and List
2005)
Several aspects are studied: First, we inspect how advisors form beliefs about
the risk preferences of specific advisees given sociodemographic information.
We also check whether advisors’ beliefs are subject to false consensus (Hsee
and Weber 1997, Hadar and Fischer 2008) regarding their own risk preferences.
This would indicate that they overestimate the extent to which other people
are similar to themselves. Furthermore, we investigate how precise the advisors’
1Artefactual field experiments use the tools of a standard lab experiment with a non-
standard subject pool (Harrison and List, 2004).
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beliefs are. Instead of analyzing whether the advisors’ stated beliefs coincide
with the advisees’ actual decisions, we make use of the data of a German large-
scale representative survey (SOEP) in order to generalize our result. Therefore,
we compare the advisor’s belief with the average decision of subjects in the
SOEP data conditional on the sociodemographic characteristics of the observed
advisees.
In the experiment, subjects in two different roles participate: advisors, or sub-
jects who form beliefs, and subjects on whom beliefs are formed - advisees.
Our experimental design incorporates these two roles as it consists of two main
parts. First, we use a web-based survey to collect data on potential advisees. In
the second part, we run an artefactual field experiment consisting of four treat-
ments. In the first treatment, we elicit the advisor’s own risk attitude. In the
subsequent treatments, we vary the information available to the advisor when
forming beliefs about the risk preferences of a specific advisee as collected in the
survey of part one. In the second and the third treatment advisors are able to
draw on several sociodemographic variables. In the last treatment, the advisor
is provided with the advisee’s picture instead of sociodemographic information.
The results of the experiment show that a false consensus bias of the advisors
is present. Indeed, the advisors’ own risk preferences positively correlate with
their beliefs on the advisees. Interestingly, this is especially pronounced for
experienced financial advisors and non-professionals. Besides the advisors’ own
risk preferences, the advisees’ gender and the self-assessment of risk are consid-
ered to be important by the advisors when forming beliefs. In general, advisees
are perceived as less risk tolerant than the advisors are themselves.
In a further step we investigate whether the advisors’ beliefs coincide with the
advisees’ actual choices. We find that information on family status and the
advisee’s self-assessment on risk improve predictions of risk preferences. Fur-
thermore, the precision increases if more information is available. Professionals
exhibit a significantly higher accuracy in the forecast than non-professionals.
Our paper is the first to observe the process of forming beliefs about risk prefer-
ences of others based on several sociodemographics in detail. We can explicitly
control for the available information. A major advantage is the subject pool of
financial advisors.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: In the next section (section 2),
we discuss the literature on risk preferences and advice. Section 3 explains
the experimental design, while section 4 presents the results. In section 5 we
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provide several robustness checks with an alternative risk measure followed by
concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Literature
When making risky decisions subjects strongly react to advice (Allen 2001,
Schotter 2003). Furthermore, people prefer to have advice when making a de-
cision. Surprisingly, this is even true when it is common knowledge that the
advisor does not have any information advantage in the field of the decision
(Nyarko et al. 2006, Schotter and Sopher 2007). A prominent example is that
subjects even demand advice for the outcome of a fair coin-flip (Powdthavee
and Riyanto 2012). One explanation why subjects are keen on advice is that
during the advice process people rethink their decision problem more in-depth
and are therefore able to make better decisions (Schotter 2003).
To give good advice it is essential for the advisor to know the advisee’s pref-
erences. Recent research on risk preferences has detected significant linkages
between sociodemographic characteristics and risk attitudes. It is largely undis-
puted that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999,
Croson and Gneezy 2009). Furthermore, individuals are found to be more risk
averse if they are older, married, or have children (Dohmen et al. 2011). Re-
garding the relationship of education or income with risk tolerance the findings
in the literature are ambiguous (c.f. Belzil and Leonardi 2007, Barsky et al.
1997, Dohmen et al. 2011, Hartog et al. 2002).
In contrast to the above research that studies actual correlations, advisors form
their beliefs according to their perceived correlation between an advisee’s so-
ciodemographics and his or her risk attitude. One strategy to figure out some-
body’s preferences is stereotyping. Eckel and Grossman (2008) study gender
stereotypes. In their study, females tolerate less risk than males as found pre-
viously. Furthermore, the beliefs about gender are consistent since women are
perceived to be less risk tolerant. If, instead of individuals’ stereotypes, groups’
stereotypes are elicited, subjects overestimate the risk tolerance of the male
group, while the female group is correctly assessed (Siegrist et al. 2002). In
terms of cultural stereotypes, people perceive Chinese to be less risk tolerant
than Americans. Interestingly, the actual experimental data shows an opposite
correlation (Hsee and Weber 1999).
Studying the beliefs on others’ risk preferences is particularly interesting with
4
respect to financial decision making. Regarding financial advice, Faro and Rot-
tenstreich (2006) inspect how subjects predict others’ risky choices. Their find-
ings show a systematic bias towards risk neutrality when estimating the risk
preferences of others. In their experiment - in contrast to the setting of Eckel
and Grossman (2008) - the advisors have to assess how a randomly chosen sub-
ject decided. Hsee and Weber (1997) study differences between a subject’s own
risk preferences and the subject’s beliefs about others’ risk preferences. The
authors show that the differences increase with social distance. If subjects have
to assess an abstract, randomly chosen subject from the session, the self-other
discrepancy occurs. It is absent if the judging subject has visual contact with
the judged subject. No further information is transmitted in both situations,
the judging subject is unknown to the judge.
Another aspect that is raised in the literature is the false consensus bias in
belief formation (Hsee and Weber 1997, Hadar and Fischer 2008). Subjects’
beliefs about the risk preferences of another person are consistently biased to-
wards their own risk attitude. A restriction of these studies is that no monetary
incentives are used to elicit the advisors’ risk aversion or the advisors’ belief.
Daruvala (2007) explores gender differences in beliefs when predicting risk pref-
erences of others. She finds that gender stereotypes as well as the subject’s own
risk attitudes affect the belief. However, there is no incentive compatible mech-
anism applied to elicit the beliefs on others in this design. Chakravarty et al.
(2011) inspect risk taking in delegated decisions by using lottery gambles. The
subjects have to judge the risk preferences of other participants of the experi-
ment. Judging and judged subject are seated in different rooms, and again, no
further information on the judged subject is provided. When making the lottery
decision for this anonymous advisee, advisors exhibit a significantly higher risk
aversion compared to their own risk attitude. In addition, the increase in risk
aversion is relative to their own risk preferences, which again supports the false
consensus hypothesis.
There is evidence that financial professionals exhibit a different behavior in de-
cision making than the average population (Haigh and List 2005, Nofsinger and
Varma 2007, Slovic et al. 1999). People choose their job according to their
preferences (Dohmen and Falk 2011). It is argued that individuals which are
willing to take more risk sort into occupations with a higher variance in in-
come (Bonin et al. 2007, Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln 2005) or even with a
higher mortality risk (Deleire and Levy 2004). The premium dependent incen-
5
tive schemes in the financial sector could be a reason for the sorting of financial
professionals.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways: First, in our experiment
advisors are provided with a set of sociodemographic characteristics of specific
and vivid advisees. In the literature so far, only a single sociodemographic in-
formation is presented and varied. Based on this information, advisors form
their belief about the risk preferences of the advisees. We can study the ad-
visors’ belief formation process while explicitly controlling for the information
available. Second, incentives are provided for the elicitation of the advisors’
risk preferences and beliefs, while this is not the case in previous studies. A
major advantage of our approach is our subject pool consisting of financial pro-
fessionals and non-professionals. This allows us to study behavioral differences
of subjects familiar and unfamiliar with giving advice.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment investigates beliefs about the risk preferences of others.2 This
involves two distinct roles: subjects who form beliefs (advisors) and subjects
about whom beliefs are formed (advisees). Therefore our experimental setup
consists of two main parts (c.f. Figure 1).3 In a first part, we collect data on
risk preferences of advisees in a web-based survey as described in section 3.2.
From this data, we choose the advisees that are presented to advisors in the
second part. We augment this information by survey data from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) to control for representativity as discussed in
section 3.3.
In the second part, we run an experiment consisting of four treatments. When
entering the lab the advisors are randomly assigned to a computer and then log
on to the experimental software. All treatments are played one after another
without interaction between the advisors. Hence, we treat each subject as an
independent observation. The payoffs of the whole experiment are shown after
all treatments are finished to avoid learning effects. At first treatment SELF
is played, which asks for the advisors’ sociodemographic information and their
own risk attitude using two risk measures.4 These two risk tasks are described
2In the literature ’prediction’, ’forecast’ and ’belief’ are used interchangeably.
3The instructions of both parts of the experiment can be found in the appendix.
4SELF is followed by a further treatment that is discussed in a companion paper (Leuer-
mann and Roth 2012). We do not expect interference for the presented results as the advisors
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in section 3.1. In the second (RANK) as well as in the third treatment (PAY)
advisors forecast the risk preferences of four advisees’ profiles, each chosen from
the web survey of part 1. For each advisee profile we present a screen with
the advisee’s sociodemographic information. Subsequently, the advisor is asked
to predict the advisee’s actual decision in the same two risk measures used in
SELF. RANK and PAY differ in the way the sociodemographics are presented
to the advisor. A detailed description is given in section 3.3. The last treatment
(PICT) is similar to RANK and PAY. However, advisors are provided only with
four pictures of advisees instead of sociodemographic information. Before we
describe the experiment in detail, we introduce the used risk measures in the
following section.
Figure 1: Experimental Design: Course of Action
3.1 Measures of Risk Aversion
The experiment uses a well-studied, easily understandable lottery question to
measure risk preferences. The exact wording is as follows:
e100,000 question Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imag-
ine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the win-
nings, you receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which are as follows: There
is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount
invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the
offer. What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially
risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Decision e100,000 - e80,000 - e60,000 - e40,000 - e20,000 - Nothing, I would
decline the offer.
The elicitation mechanism is an ordered lottery selection design in which sub-
jects can invest up to e100,000 into a lottery that doubles or halves the amount
do not receive any feedback from this further treatment.
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invested with equal probabilities.5 It is called “e100,000 question” in the fol-
lowing and is borrowed from the SOEP panel. This provides the opportunity
to cross-check our experimental data with the large-scale data of the survey.
The reliability of this measure has been validated via a lab experiment with
real money at stake (Dohmen et al. 2011).
Beside this risk measure, all treatments are played with the measure of Holt
and Laury (2002) (in the following: HL-lottery) in addition. The results serve
as robustness checks and allow to generalize our results with respect to the risk
measure employed. A detailed description of the HL-lottery and the results are
presented in section 5.1.
3.2 Part 1: Surveys
Our main objective is to study how advisors assess the risk preferences of specific
advisees. As we analyze how the variation of sociodemographic information is
incorporated into the assessment of the advisees’ risk preferences, it is crucial
to achieve sufficient sociodemographic heterogeneity in the pool of advisees.
To collect the subject pool from which the advisees’ profiles are then selected,
we ran a web-based survey in November and December 2010.6 This allows us
to generate a heterogeneous sample in several sociodemographic characteristics.
Furthermore, we ask the participants about their sociodemographics and elicit
their choices in the HL-lottery and the e100,000 question.
In the course of the experiment, we make use of the fact that the e100,000
question is also part of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) survey to
generalize our results.7 This large-scale dataset surveys approximately 20,750
subjects yearly and is therefore a powerful and representative tool for our pur-
pose. At first, we will compare the advisees selected for presentation to the
advisors with subjects in the SOEP to ensure that the advisees do not differ
from the population in general. Second, in section 4.4 we analyze whether the
advisors’ beliefs coincide with the advisees’ actual choices. To assess whether
5In order to provide incentives to take the decision in the lab experiment thoroughly, for
the actual payoff we convert the e100,000 into e2.50, e80,000 into e2 etc. Scale: To improve
readability, in the analyses, we present the data in ’e10,000 invested’ such that the data is
scaled from 0 to 10.
6Participants were recruited via e-mail and were asked to further distribute the survey.
Among all participants who completed the web-based survey we raﬄed off e50.
7C.f. www.diw.de/soep for further information. The e100,000 question was included in
the year 2009.
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advisors’ beliefs are correct, the mean risk preferences of a subsample of the
SOEP population comparable in sociodemographics to the actual advisee is
taken as a benchmark. This allows us to conclude whether advisors are able to
assess average advisees.
Restrictively, while the SOEP survey is a representative sample of the German
population, this does not hold for the web survey as can be observed by com-
paring the descriptive statistics of the sociodemographics in Table 1, column
two and three. However, the heterogeneity of sociodemographic characteristics
within these two pools is large compared with a sample that mainly consists of
students as Table 1 (compare column ’non-professionals’, which mainly consists
of students) shows.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Subjects in Surveys and Lab Experiment
Part 1: Surveys Part 2: Lab Experiment
Web survey SOEP survey Non-prof. Junior prof. Senior prof.
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
N 84 - 20,750 - 77 - 52 - 38 -
Year born 1979 10.0 1959 17.71 1986 6.29 1989 1.06 1973 11.0
Gender (female=1) 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39
Partner (yes=1) 0.41 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.48
Parent (yes=1) 0.20 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.51
High income* (yes=1) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.31
Uni degree (yes=1) 0.59 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.94 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.49
Counsel. Exp. (in years) - - - - - - 1.02 1.07 10.97 8.27
Stated risk attitudeθ 3.54 1.81 1.90 2.13 5.26 1.39 5.08 1.52 4.68 1.71
HL∆ 5.30 1.78 - - 6.81 1.56 6.33 1.78 6.32 2.08
100,000ψ 2.38 2.70 0.91 1.98 4.70 3.29 4.00 2.44 3.11 3.18
* refers to a monthly net income above e6,000 (approx. 8460$).
θ Subjects chose on a scale from 0 (=risk averse) to 10 (=fully prepared to take risks).
∆ refers to the row in which Option B was chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery.
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the e100,000 question in e10,000.
Selection of Advisees for RANK and PAY In total, eight profiles are
used in RANK and PAY - four for each treatment. These profiles are chosen
from the web-based survey and are displayed in Table 2. The sequence in which
these eight profiles are shown to the advisors is random. This means a profile
could appear as the second advisee to be assessed in RANK but also as the
fourth in PAY, for example. Nonetheless, every advisor sees all eight profiles
in random order in RANK or PAY.
Within the described experimental design it is vital to choose the set of our
advisees thoughtfully. The eight advisees are chosen out of the 84 subjects of
the web survey in order to achieve a balanced and diversified sample over age,
education, family status, income, gender, and parenthood as presented in Table
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Table 2: Profiles of Advisees Selected for Presentation in RANK and PAY
Age Education Family
status
Net income
(in e)
Gender Child. Risk
indexθ
100,
000ψ
SOEP
meanψ
HL∆
64 university married >6,000 male yes 1 2 2.55 5
38 training single 1,001-3,000 female no 2 0 0.83 6
25 econ student partner <1,000 male no 5 4 1.29 6
30 training married 1,001-3,000 male yes 1 4 1.01 8
36 adv training single 3,001-6,000 male no 1 2 3.24 5
57 university married 3,001-6,000 female yes 0 4 0.62 7
41 university divorced >6,000 female no 1 2 2.50 5
21 econ student single <1,000 female no 4 0 1.59 4
θ Advisees chose on a scale from 0 (=risk averse) to 10 (=fully prepared to take risks)
∆ refers to the row in which Option B was chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery.
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the e100,000 question in e10,000.
2. The column ’100,000’ depicts the individual choices in the e100,000 ques-
tion whereas the column ’HL’ refers to the actual choices of the advisees for the
HL-lottery.
Furthermore, we have to assure that our advisee sample is approximately coher-
ent with the population. We thereby ensure that the advisee is not exceptional
in his or her risk preferences and correctly assessing the advisee is a feasible
task for the advisor. The large SOEP panel allows to accomplish this issue. We
reduce the whole SOEP population to subjects that are similar to our specific
advisees in the sociodemographic characteristics age, education, family status,
income, gender, and parenthood as presented in Table 2. From this subsample
we calculate the average of the answer to the e100,000 question. Consider for
example the advisee in the second row of Table 2. In order to compute the risk
tolerance of the ’representative counterpart’ of this advisee (consider column
’SOEP mean’), we compute the mean of the answers in the e100,000 question
given a subsample of all SOEP observations with that characteristics.8 This
subsample contains all females, aged between 32 and 43, who are single, have
an income between e1,000 and e3,000 and as education a training. On average,
people with these characteristics invest e8,300 in the lottery.
In our opinion the described procedure minimizes the advisees’ deviations from
the population mean as we only choose advisees who are similar to the popu-
lation mean. This can be observed when comparing the column ’100,000’ and
’SOEP mean’. We thereby assure that the subjects to be judged are not ex-
ceptional and it is therefore impossible to assess their risk preferences. At the
same time it provides the opportunity to let advisors judge real individuals.
8Means are weighted with a dataset-specific weighting function which considers cross-
sectional personal weights of each subject.
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Advisees for PICT In contrast to the preceding treatments, advisors exclu-
sively receive visual information on the advisees in treatment PICT. Figure 2
displays an anonymized version of the advisees’ pictures. Table 3 shows the ad-
visees’ characteristics and choices in both lotteries used in the PICT treatment.
Again, the column ’100,000’ denotes the actual choice of the e100,000 ques-
tion, whereas ’HL’ displays the value for the HL-lottery. Again, we compute
the average answer of the e100,000 question based on a subsample of the SOEP
data. Therefore we assume gender and age to be observable to the advisors.
In order to determine the ’SOEP mean’ variable, we consider all SOEP panel
participants which are born between 1976 and 1988 and have the respective
gender.9 In the experiment, advisors either have to assess four male advisees or
four female advisees, which will be randomly determined per session.
Figure 2: Treatment PICT: Pictures Presented
female 1 female 2 female 3 female 4
male 1 male 2 male 3 male 4
3.3 Part 2: Lab Experiment
The experimental sessions took place between April 2011 and January 2012. In
total, 167 subjects in the role of advisors participated.10 In the subject pool
we have three types of advisors: senior professional advisors, junior professional
9The actual advisees in PICT are born between 1978 and 1985; this information is not
transmitted to the advisors.
10The experiment involves no interaction among the advisors, therefore each advisor is
treated as an independent observation.
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Table 3: Risk Attitudes of Advisees in Treatment PICT
Gender 100,000ψ SOEP meanψ HL∆
female 2 1.13 4
female 6 1.13 5
female 4 1.13 4
female 4 1.13 7
male 6 1.69 4
male 0 1.69 3
male 6 1.69 6
male 6 1.69 8
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the
e100,000 question in e10,000.
∆ refers to the row in which Option B was
chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery.
advisors and non-professionals. The non-professionals are mainly students and
hired via the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University where all sessions with non-
professionals were run.11 The senior professional advisors were recruited from
a large German financial advisory agency and from local banks. The junior
advisors were recruited from a banking specific advanced training institution.12
After finishing high school, the junior professionals enter a study program in
financial advisory at an applied university which contains practical counsel-
ing in up to 50% of time. Since these advisors are students, regarding age
and education, they are comparable to the non-professional advisors. Detailed
information on the advisor pool and descriptives are given in Table 1. The
experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes. The average payoff was e11.92.
In the following we present the four treatments (SELF, RANK, PAY, PICT).
RANK, PAY and PICT differ in the way the information is provided to the
advisor. As discussed in the previous section, the information in RANK and
PAY is drawn from the following categories of the advisees’ sociodemographic
characteristics: age, education, family status, income, gender, having children
and self-assessment of risk-taking in financial matters. The possible realiza-
tions of these variables are shown in Table 4. In PICT only visual information
is provided.
3.3.1 Treatments
11The experiment was programmed on a PHP-platform and accessible via a Web Browser.
12We ran seven sessions with professionals - three in the lab and four on-site. In all sessions,
the conditions (no communication among participants, space between computers, the visual
presentation of the experiment) were identical.
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Table 4: Information/Categories Provided in RANK and PAY
Age In years
Education University, Master, training, in training, no formal training
Family status single, partner, married, divorced, living separated, widowed
Net income up to e1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-e6,000, more than e6,000
Gender male, female
Parenthood having children, having no children
Risk Index Self-assessment of risk with the question: Regarding financial mat-
ters, are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?(0=risk averse to 10=fully
prepared to take risks)
Procedure Treatment SELF In the SELF treatment, the advisors’ own
sociodemographics and their risk preferences are elicited. At first, advisors
answer the questions on their sociodemographics. Subsequently, first they play
the e100,000 question followed by the HL-lottery.
Procedure Treatment RANK The task in this treatment is to assess cor-
rectly the risk preferences of an advisee. As discussed above, for this purpose
we chose eight advisee profiles providing sociodemographics as shown in Table
4. Out of the eight profiles, four are randomly selected to be presented to the
advisors in RANK. However, in RANK (as well as in PAY) the advisors are
able to influence with which probability the respective sociodemographic infor-
mation about the advisee is provided to them. At the beginning of the RANK
treatment, as depicted in Figure 3, advisors are asked to state a ranking over
the seven sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., 1. age , 2. gender, 3. income,
4. risk index,... ) and advisors are informed that based on the revealed sociode-
mographic information they have to assess certain advisees. In the following
the computer draws a random number that determines how many categories
are disclosed.13 If for example, the random number is two and we are dealing
with the advisee of the last row of Table 2, the computer displays the following
information: age: 21 years old and gender: female.
After the presentation of the advisee’s characteristics, the advisor has to as-
sess how this specific advisee has decided in the e100,000 question and the
HL-lottery. For this advisee the correct answers would be 0 for the e100,000
question and 4 for the HL-lottery (see Table 2). If the answers are correct, the
13The random number is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [1,7]. Hence,
the category on the first rank is observed for sure.
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advisor is paid e0.50 for each risk task.
In total, this procedure is repeated for four advisee profiles. The ranking stated
at the beginning is kept for all profiles. However, for each profile a new random
number is drawn and, of course, a new advisee profile is presented. Hence, the
advisors evaluate four profiles one after another before moving on to the PAY
treatment.
Figure 3: Course of Action in Treatments RANK, PAY and PICT
Procedure Treatment PAY In the PAY treatment, advisors can freely
choose which and if characteristics out of the available seven are presented
to them. In contrast to RANK, the advisors have to pay for each category they
want to see in each round separately (c.f. Figure 3). The characteristics are
priced according to a convex pricing rule. The first characteristic costs e0.01
while buying all seven characteristics amounts to e0.99 in total.14 When enter-
ing the PAY treatment, the advisor is asked which categories he or she wants
to buy. If, for example, the advisor wants to see age and gender, the total price
amounts to e0.03. On the next screen the categories are shown (e.g., age: 21
years old and gender: female for the above example) and the advisor is asked
to assess the risk preference of this profile. Again, the advisor earns e0.50 for
each correctly assessed risk task. On the subsequent screen, the advisor is asked
to buy the sociodemographic characteristics for the next profile. As in RANK,
this procedure is repeated for four profiles in total. Out of the eight profiles of
Table 2, the remaining four after the RANK treatment are presented to the ad-
visors. However, the advisor is able buy different categories for different profiles.
Procedure Treatment PICT As mentioned above, in the PICT treatment
solely visual information is the basis for the advisor’s prediction. After finishing
the PAY treatment, advisors enter the PICT treatment. First, advisors open
14Price for the second characteristic: e0.02, the third: e0.03, the fourth: e0.06, the fifth:
e0.12, the sixth: e0.24, the seventh: e0.50. As the minimum earnings that are generated
before the PAY treatment amount to e4, net losses are excluded.
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an envelope containing a sheet of paper showing four pictures. The task is then
the same as in the treatment before. The advisors are asked to assess the risk
preferences of the depicted advisees one after another. Again for every correct
prediction e0.50 are paid off.
The advisors exclusively have the information provided on the photo available.
In each session either four males or four female photos are used. Which gen-
der is presented is randomly assigned. Although we do not explicitly provide
any further sociodemographic information, at least gender and possibly age can
be inferred from the pictures. The photos show individuals who are of similar
appearance and are dressed alike. By holding the age, gender and the style of
clothing constant we force the advisors to form their beliefs given the charac-
teristics of the face only. In Figure 2 the anonymized pictures can be found.
Overall, out of the 167 advisors there are 91 advisors judging the pictures of
women and 76 advisors judging the pictures of men.
4 Results
After introducing the different treatments, the following section presents the
results. In this section we contribute to four questions. Section 4.1 studies
differences in the belief formation in the different treatments and sheds a light
on self-other discrepancies. Secondly, in section 4.2 we investigate how infor-
mation on the advisee’s sociodemographic characteristics affects the advisor’s
belief. Section 4.3 studies how differences in sociodemographic characteristics
between advisor and advisee influence the advisor’s deviation from his own risk
preferences when forming his belief. Finally, in section 4.4 we inspect if the
advisors’ beliefs are correct. For this we combine representative survey data
with lab data.
4.1 Self-assessment and Beliefs
In this section, we analyze how the advisors’ own risk preferences relate to their
beliefs. The term self-other discrepancy refers to a systematic misperception
between the advisor’s own risk tolerance and the perceived risk tolerance of
the advisee. This effect is found by Hsee and Weber (1997) but also discussed
by Eckel and Grossman (2008), Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) and Eriksen
and Kvaløy (2009). Regarding the process of giving advice it is important to
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analyze whether advisors judge themselves to be more or less risk tolerant than
the advisees evaluated.
In order to investigate this effect, we present the advisor’s self-assessment in the
e100,000 question (SELF) compared to their beliefs separately for the three
treatments RANK, PAY and PICT in Figure 4. The decisions are aggregated
for all three groups of advisors. The first column ’SELF’ indicates the advisor’s
own decision. The second column denotes the beliefs for the RANK treatment,
the third represents the beliefs for the PAY treatment and the fourth and last
stands for the beliefs in the PICT treatment. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test does
not detect a statistical difference between the beliefs in RANK and PAY at
the 1%-level. We conclude that the way we let advisors rank and select the
sociodemographic information does not affect the belief formation.
However, we find statistically different distributions for the comparison of all
other pairs, e.g., SELF vs. RANK and PAY as well as PICT vs. RANK and PAY
vs. all other treatments at the 1%-level. The results indicate that the advisors
on average take more risk in their own decisions compared to the beliefs about
their advisees’ risk preferences. In other words, the advisors perceive their
advisees to be less risk tolerant. If analyzed individually, 80% of the beliefs in
RANK and PAY exhibit either the same risk or are more risk averse than the
advisors’ own choice. A self-other discrepancy indeed exists.
Interestingly, the choices of PICT are not statistically different from the choices
in SELF. This could be due to the fact that in PICT less information is provided.
As a proxy, advisors use their own risk preferences in these cases.
4.2 How Do Advisors Form Beliefs?
In order to analyze how the advisors assess others’ risk preferences based on
sociodemographics, we set up three regression models which are presented in
Table 5. The data of RANK and PAY is pooled in the regressions since we do
not find statistically significant differences in the beliefs.15 As the 167 advisors
have to judge four randomly chosen advisees in each treatment, the pooled
decisions sum up to 1,336 observations.
We run an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the belief on the
eight advisees.16 However, how much and which information is available to
15Furthermore, we control for potential differences with a dummy variable.
16Remember that for a better readability, in the analyses, we present the belief in the
e100,000 question in ’e10,000 invested’ such that the beliefs is scaled from 0 to 10.
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Table 5: Regression Results: Belief Formation
Model (1) (2) (3)
dependent variable belief belief belief
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Year of birth -19.48 -15.26 -12.2
15.63 15.16 15.11
No uni 0.222 0.171 0.166
0.230 0.210 0.205
Single -0.00252 -0.0251 -0.0312
0.185 0.171 0.170
Low income -0.00822 -0.0794 -0.0812
0.159 0.148 0.148
Male 0.666*** 0.651*** 0.654***
0.224 0.201 0.198
No children 0.206 0.413** 0.414**
0.193 0.177 0.176
Risk index -3.365*** -3.340*** -3.387***
0.322 0.302 0.288
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}
Year of birth 0.00989 0.00776 0.00623
0.00794 0.0077 0.00767
Uni degree -0.0261 -0.00661 -0.0164
0.246 0.231 0.224
Partner -0.269 -0.188 -0.185
0.216 0.207 0.208
High income 1.409*** 1.429*** 1.458***
0.240 0.237 0.231
Female -1.118*** -1.133*** -1.158***
0.218 0.218 0.217
Children -0.654*** -0.748*** -0.766***
0.251 0.246 0.243
Risk index 0.885*** 0.887*** 0.878***
0.113 0.104 0.101
R
is
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Self 0.183*** 0.186***
0.0352 0.0495
Self · junior -0.142**
0.0696
Self · senior 0.103
0.0905
Junior -0.667** -0.422** 0.146
0.189 0.176 0.295
Senior -0.653** -0.265 -0.587*
0.282 0.241 0.317
Rank -0.0709 -0.0885 -0.0886
0.0982 0.0971 0.0970
Constant 3.781*** 2.756*** 2.742***
0.351 0.333 0.341
N 1,336 1,336 1,336
R2 0.43 0.474 0.483
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.464 0.472
Advisee FE yes yes yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered at advisors’ level. Dependent variable:
advisor’s belief in e100,000 question. 1{seen = 1} indicates a characteristic is visible. {soc dem}
indicates the realization of the characteristic. The left-out category is 1{seen=0}.
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Figure 4: Advisors’ own Risk Preferences and Beliefs in Treatments (e100,000
question)
Table 6: Wald Test on Joint Significance (P-values) of Coefficients in Table 5
Model (1) (2) (3)
H0 : {socdem = 0}+ {socdem 6= 0}=0
Year of Birth 0.4207 0.3155 0.4207
Education 0.3891 0.3461 0.3891
Family status 0.2277 0.2350 0.2277
Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gender 0.0022 0.0046 0.0022
Parenthood 0.1400 0.1692 0.1400
Risk index 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
each advisor when forming the belief depends on the ranking and the random
number (RANK) or on how many categories are bought (PAY). The empiri-
cal models have to incorporate different states of available information of the
advisor when making the prediction. Therefore, we include two major sets of
variables. The estimated models thereby allow to evaluate how advisors adopt
their beliefs when information on different categories is available.
The dummy variables in the upper part (1{seen=1}) bear a value of one if
the corresponding characteristic is visible. The variables in the part below
(1{seen=1}· {soc dem 6=0}) are interaction terms carrying the value of the
variable itself and are interacted with the upper dummy variables. Thus the
value of the characteristic shows up only if it is observable.17 The omitted cat-
17Note that the value of the sociodemographic information on ’income’, ’education’ and
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egory in this specification is ‘not seen’ (1{seen=0}). Hence, this allows us to
interpret the results as the marginal effects of the specific characteristics if it
is observed. In this specification the coefficients of the upper set of dummy
variables reflect the effect if the actual value of the variable is zero (e.g., the
effect on male, as the gender dummy variable has a value of 0 for male and 1
for female).
Additionally, by including dummy variables for the junior and senior profession-
als respectively, we disentangle deviations in the behavior of the groups being
familiar with giving advice. Since the unit of observation is the advisor, the
errors are clustered on the level of the advisors.
Given the econometric specification, we compute the scope of adjustment of
the advisors’ forecast dependent on the observable information. Generally, we
expect the signs to be coherent with recent literature such as Dohmen et al.
(2011) who used the same risk measure; we expect an advisor’s belief to be
more risk averse if an advisee is female instead of male. A companion paper
(Leuermann and Roth 2012) that uses the same subjects reports that especially
males, younger people, singles and non-parents are on average associated with
a higher degree of risk taking. Advisors are thus expected to form their beliefs
according to the known correlations. While model (1) serves as the baseline
specification, model (2) and (3) include advisors’ risk preferences in addition.
The regression results show that the risk index, gender and income variable
are highly significant for both sets of controls in all models. By evaluating the
gender variable in model (1) we find that advisors increase their forecast for the
e100,000 question by e6,660 on average if a male is assessed. The investment
decreases by e4,520 if a female is indicated.18 In effect, males are expected
to invest e4,520 more in the lottery than females. A Wald test on the joint
significance over both sets of controls ({socdem = 0} + {socdem 6= 0} = 0)
reveals joint significance at the 1%-level (Table 6). The correlation between
gender and risk preferences as suggested by the literature is thus incorporated
into the advisor’s belief.
A similar statement can be made for the variable risk index. The variable ’risk
’family status’ is converted into a dummy variable to ease the interpretation. ’Income’ is
divided into high income (value=1) and low income (value=0), ’education’ into advisees with
(value=1) or without (value=0) university degree and ’family status’ into having a partner
(value=1) and not having a partner (value=0).
18To calculate the total effect, we have to sum both the male and female coefficient; the
total effect turns out to be negative.
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index’ in the upper part has the value of one if the advisee’s risk index is zero and
visible to the advisor. The fact that it shows up to be significant decreases the
investment by approximately e33,650.19 We find that on average the advisors
increase their investment forecast by e8,850 for each point the advisee’s risk
index variable increases. Both coefficients are jointly significant. Regarding the
income variable, we observe that advisors adjust their belief only if an advisee
with high income is observed. The interaction dummy variable indicating high
income reports that the amount invested in the lottery increases by e14,090.20
In addition to the advisee fixed effects we incorporate advisor attributes in
model (2). The ‘self’ variable contains the advisor’s own risk attitude. This
variable turns out to be highly significant. This is an interesting finding since
the forecast is not only made on the grounds of the provided information about
the advisees but is also related to the advisor’s own risk attitude. Especially
the size of the coefficient shows the considerable influence of the advisor’s pref-
erences. Together with the dependent variable, this variable is located on the
same domain. For every e1,000 an advisor invests into the lottery, he or she
expects the advisee to invest e183 more, on average. This implicates that an
advisor’s own risk attitude serves as a reference point for judging others. The
inclusion of further advisor’s characteristics (e.g., gender, age) shows a stable
influence of the advisor’s risk preferences (not reported).
In model (3) we are interested in whether professional experience changes the
extent to which advisors base their belief on their own risk preferences. Sim-
ilarly to the ’self’ variable we include two more interaction variables: ’self ·
junior’ and ’self · senior’.21 These variables interact the advisor’s risk prefer-
ences with a dummy variable of the respective advisor’s type. This specification
allows to analyze systematic differences of the influence of the advisors’ own risk
attitude on the beliefs in the different advisor groups. The coefficient of ’self’
stays largely unchanged when comparing model (2) and model (3). Hence, the
non-professional advisor expects, on average and ceteris paribus, an advisee to
invest e186 more into the lottery for every e1,000 the advisor invests himself.
The junior professionals’ advice decisions are not based on their own risk pref-
19The advisees’ choices of risk index range from 0 to 5 (Table 2).
20Note: High income refers to a monthly net income of e6,000 and more. Regarding the
correlation between income and risk preferences, results in the literature are ambiguous (see
section 2). For the information on parenthood, we can observe that the effect is significant
if the advisor observes that the advisee has children. Nevertheless, the Wald test on joint
significance in Table 6 proves that this is not significant.
21The omitted category is ’non-professional’.
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erences because the coefficients ’self · junior’ and ’self’ are jointly not sig-
nificant as proven by a Wald test. In contrast to that, senior professionals
show no significantly different behavior compared to the omitted category ’non-
professionals’. The false consensus bias is thus driven by senior professionals
and non-professionals, while junior professionals seem to abstain from using
their own decision as reference point.
As suggested above, pooling the data of RANK and PAY is not an issue since
’Rank’ is insignificant in all models. The variables controlling for the advisor’s
type indicate that professionals compared to the non-professional advisors gen-
erally believe that advisees invest a lower amount in the e100,000 question.
In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates that advisors adjust their beliefs ac-
cording to the available information. In particular, the significant variables show
the presumed signs. Furthermore we conclude that they use their own risk at-
titude as a reference point. Hence, this matches the findings of Chakravarty et
al. (2011) and others who report a correlation between advisors’ and advisees’
preferences.
4.3 Does Social Distance Matter?
In this section we trace a question raised by Hsee and Weber (1997). Arguably,
the self-other discrepancy described in section 4.1 could be caused by the social
distance of advisee and advisor. The reasoning can be summarized as follows:
If an advisor recognizes an advisee to be similar in observable characteristics,
the advisor alleges the advisee to have similar preferences. Hence, the devia-
tion between the advisor’s preferences and the advisor’s belief should depend
in the sociodemographic similarities - or social distance. We interpret the so-
cial distance as the absolute difference between the advisor’s and the advisee’s
sociodemographic characteristics. Following this argument, the belief and the
advisor’s own lottery choice should coincide if both, advisor and advisee, share
the same gender or family status, for example.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we estimate a regression shown in Table
7. The dependent variable is the absolute difference between an advisor’s self-
assessment and the belief on the advisee. As independent variables we include
the absolute differences between the advisor’s and the advisee’s sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, derived for each category separately. To account for
the experimental design, these variables are interacted with a dummy variable
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Table 7: Regression Results: Social Distance
Model (4)
dependent variable |belief-own choice|
|ad
v
is
o
r
-
ad
v
is
ee
|·
1
{s
ee
n
=
1
}
Year of birth 0.00992
0.00861
Education 0.103
0.233
Family status -0.0524
0.222
Income 0.0821
0.229
Gender 0.292
0.179
Parenthood 0.597**
0.250
Risk index 0.412***
0.0354
Junior prof. -0.946***
0.163
Senior prof. -1.118***
0.18
Rank 0.112
0.146
Constant 3.143***
0.208
Observations 1,336
R2 0.131
Dummy if char. seen yes
Advisee FE yes
Results of Random effects model, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, dependent variable: absolute difference
between advisor’s belief and advisor’s own risk preferences. 1{seen=1} indicates if a characteristic is seen.
which is equal to one if the specific category is visible in the experiment (c.f.
section 3.3). In a similar manner as in the models (1) to (3), additionally we
include a set of dummy variables that indicates if the particular variable is seen
by the advisee.22 Furthermore we control for differences between the treatments
and the different advisor groups.
Considering the results of model (4) in Table 7, we find significant effects for
the variables risk index and children. Hence, the absolute difference in the risk
index between advisor and advisee positively correlates (ceteris paribus) with
the absolute difference between the self-assessment and the belief. These results
indicate that advisors perceive the risk index as a reliable measure and adjust
their beliefs and their behavior according to this variable. With respect to the
22In contrast to the former models, these dummy variables are not displayed and inter-
preted.
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variable children, the positive sign of the significant coefficient can be inter-
preted as follows: If advisors recognize that they do not share the parenthood
status with the advisee, they update their belief as they deviate from their own
preferences. In the analyses above, gender turned out to be a major predictor
for the risk preferences of others. Interestingly, there is no significant gender
effect in model (4).
Similarly to the findings in section 4.2, there is a significantly different behavior
of the professionals compared to the non-professional advisors, as the respec-
tive control variables show. The self-other discrepancy is found to be smaller for
professionals than for non-professionals. Junior and senior professionals devi-
ate from their risk preferences to a smaller extent than non-professionals. This
does not contradict our findings regarding the false consensus bias derived in
the previous section. There, our interest is in the correlation between advisors’
risk preferences and beliefs, while in this part we analyze the absolute difference.
4.4 Prediction Error
One of the research questions raised in the introduction is whether the advisors’
beliefs coincide with the advisees’ actual risk preferences. In other words, we
analyze if the advisors’ beliefs are correct. Furthermore, we inspect whether
and which information is a prerequisite for forming precise beliefs. In order
to answer this question we combine our experimental data with the large-scale
heterogeneous data from the SOEP. This allows us to generalize our results and
to make statements on a representative level.
Derivation of Prediction Errors In a similar manner as described in sec-
tion 3.2, we compute the risk preferences of ’representative counterparts’ of the
advisees in order to make use of the higher predictive power of the SOEP data.
However, in contrast to section 3.2 we have to take into account that not all
characteristics are visible to the advisor when making the prediction. Hence,
the subsample on which the conditional average of the answer to the e100,000
question is based has to be adjusted to the available information for every sin-
gle assessment. Take for example the advisee in the second row of Table 2. If
the advisor sees all seven characteristics, this could be due to the fact that the
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random number is seven in RANK or the advisor buys all seven categories in
PAY. In this case, the conditional mean is computed as described in section 3.2
and would amount to an investment of e8,300. However, if the advisor buys
only gender, or alternatively, ranked gender first and the random number is
one, the subset contains all female observations. On average, panel participants
of the SOEP with this characteristic invest e6,878 in the lottery. In the PICT
treatment, only the gender and potentially the age is observable. By studying
all males or females being 25 to 35 years old, the ’representative counterparts’
are constructed for the PICT treatment. Hence, for every single observation,
we have to compute this average, given the observed characteristics.23
By the above procedure we obtain a value for every observation which proxies
the advisee’s actual decision. In order to analyze if the advisor’s belief is cor-
rect, we compute the advisor’s prediction error. For this we take the squared
difference of the advisor’s belief and the computed average choice from above.
This difference serves as the dependent variable for the analyses below.
Figure 5: Quantiles: Prediction Error in RANK, PAY and PICT
Results In Figure 5 we show a quantile plot of the prediction errors by treat-
ment. The pooled prediction errors for the RANK and PAY treatment are
displayed in the left figure, while the right figure shows the prediction errors for
the PICT treatment. The 45◦-line represents the benchmark case of a uniform
distribution of the prediction errors over the quantiles. Several aspects are note-
worthy: First, the quantiles derived for the PICT treatment are closer to the
23In order to ensure representativity we employ a dataset-specific weighting function which
considers cross-sectional personal weights of each subject.
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45◦-line compared to the RANK and PAY treatment. While only about 20%
of advisors exhibit a squared prediction error of 20 and larger in RANK and
PAY, in PICT this amounts to over 50%. Hence, for the treatments RANK and
PAY, the precision of the advisors’ assessment is found to be higher. Second,
in the RANK and PAY treatment the advisors’ predictions are fairly accurate.
Approximately 60% of the observations exhibit a squared prediction error below
four. In other words: As the scale on the y-axis is squared, in 60% of the cases
the belief deviates from the actual average choice by e20,000 or less.
Given the strong differences in RANK and PAY compared to PICT, indeed ei-
ther the amount of sociodemographic information provided or which categories
are revealed might enhance precision. The visual appearance turns out not to
be a major source of information when predicting the risk preferences. We thus
expect that if the advisor has more or particular information available this leads
to lower prediction errors.24 As the information available is varied in the treat-
ments RANK and PAY, consequently, we analyze these treatments in detail. In
Table 8 we present the results of two regression models. In these models we in-
vestigate if more and which categories help to decrease the advisor’s prediction
error.
As discussed above, as dependent variable the squared difference between the
advisor’s belief and the conditional average for the respective advisee is em-
ployed. In model (5) and model (6) we include two different types of explana-
tory variables. In model (5) the variable ’sum seen’ measures the number of
sociodemographic characteristics that is visible to the advisor when making the
prediction. In model (6) the sum of visible characteristics is split up into the
different categories. For each category a dummy variable is included which in-
dicates a one if the category is uncovered. As a second set of variables in both
models we include controls for the treatment and the advisor’s type.25 Further-
more, both models correct for advisee fixed effects and employ robust standard
errors clustered on advisors.
In model (5) we find the variable ’sum seen’ to be significant at the 1%-level.
The negative sign indicates that if more categories are available, the precision
of the prediction increases. The marginal effect of -0.652 is economically rele-
vant as the mean of the squared prediction error amounts to approximately 8.7.
24A companion paper (Leuermann and Roth 2012) reports that advisors largely interpret
the information in line with the correlations found in the data.
25Note: For the advisor’s type the omitted category is ’non-professional’.
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Hence, a finding is that indeed the amount of information plays a significant
role for giving precise advice.
When considering model (6) we find a negative coefficient for the category
Table 8: Regression Results: Prediction Errors
Model (5) (6)
dependent variable (belief-choice)2 (belief-choice)2
sum seen -0.652***
0.224
1
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Year of birth -0.945
0.990
Education 1.823
1.173
Family status -2.105**
1.037
Income 0.970
1.009
Gender 0.322
1.124
Children -0.101
1.274
Risk index -8.943***
1.826
Junior prof. -4.599*** -4.011***
1.253 1.118
Senior prof. -2.197 -3.009*
1.819 1.747
Rank 0.433 -0.652
0.671 0.640
Constant 11.18*** 16.92***
1.680 2.383
N 1,336 1,336
R2 0.163 0.222
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.211
Advisee FE yes yes
Results of OLS regression, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered at advisors’
level, dependent variable: squared difference between advisors belief and actual choice of representative
advisee calculated from SOEP. 1{seen=1} indicates if a characteristic is seen.
risk index, significant at the 1%-level. This indicates that if the advisee’s self-
assessed risk preference is visible to the advisor, the squared prediction error
decreases by approximately nine units. This confirms that the risk index vari-
able possesses a significant predictive power. This is also true for the family
status variable as it decreases the squared prediction error by 2.1 units on av-
erage. The results indicate why the prediction error is found to be larger in
PICT. None of the sociodemographic categories provided in PICT - age and
gender - significantly reduce the prediction error in RANK and PAY.
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A further considerable result of this analysis is obtained with respect to the
the advisors’ types. The prediction error of the junior professionals shows up
to be significantly lower compared to the reference group of (omitted) non-
professionals. In model (5) this coefficient has a relevant impact with a value
of -4.6. When comparing the two groups of professionals we find the junior
professionals to have significantly lower prediction errors compared to the se-
nior professionals. The coefficient of the senior professionals is not significantly
different from the reference category of non-professionals. Both groups of pro-
fessional advisors perform significantly better in model (6) compared to the
non-professionals. In addition to junior professionals, also senior professionals
have a significantly lower prediction error at a significance level of 10%.
A further observation in these models is that they explain 16% to 21% of the
variation in the prediction errors. Compared to other studies analyzing risk
preferences and their determinants, this is remarkably high.
In summary, these models demonstrate that if more information is available the
prediction quality of advice increases. The variables risk index and parenthood
improve the prediction of risk preferences. A major results is that profession-
als outperform non-professionals in making precise predictions. Interestingly,
young professionals beliefs’ are even more precise than the beliefs of the senior
professionals.
5 Robustness Checks
As outlined in section 3.1, the whole experiment is executed with a second
risk measure which serves as robustness check. In the following paragraphs we
reproduce the previous analyses to back the arguments made in the sections
4.1 to 4.3. For section 4.4 we can not provide a robustness check since the
alternative risk measure is not available for the SOEP dataset. All mentioned
tables and figures can be found in the appendix.26
5.1 Risk Measure of Holt and Laury (2002)
The alternative method we employ is the multiple price list design (MPL) of
Holt and Laury (2002). In this risk task the subject has to decide in ten rows
26The results are robust for using a structural maximum likelihood estimation (Harrison
and Rutsto¨m 2008) of a utility function (U(x) = xr) with constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA).
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between two lotteries (option A and option B) as depicted in Figure 6. In each
row, except for the last row, option B has a higher payoff variance than option
A. The expected payoffs are increasing with the row number. Therefore, an
individual with monotone preferences either chooses option B in every row or
switches from A to B. The more rows a subject opts for option B, the higher
is the subject’s implied risk tolerance. A risk neutral individual would choose
option A in row one to four and switch to option B for row 5 to 10. In order to
enforce monotonicity of the risk preferences we use a switching MPL or sMPL
instead of the classic design (Andersen et al. 2006). That is, a subject does not
state ten separate decisions but has to announce in which row he or she chooses
option B for the first time. For the subject’s payoff in the lab experiment one
row out of the ten is chosen randomly with equal probability. For this row, the
lottery chosen by the subject (either option A or B) determines the payoff. The
computer draws a lot according to the winning probabilities and determines the
money won by the subject.
Although this elicitation mechanism is widely used in the literature it has its
weaknesses - it is prone to framing effects and intellectually sophisticated (Har-
rison and Rutstro¨m 2008). Nevertheless it is well-studied in many different
contexts and is extensively used in previous studies, which allows comparability
to previous results. Recent research shows that risk preferences are not stable
across mechanisms (e.g., Anderson and Mellor 2009), a second mechanism thus
allows a broader generalizability of our results. Furthermore, it is documented
that the mechanism measures risk attitudes outside the lab consistently (Harri-
son and List 2004, Harrison et al. 2007). Yet another drawback of the e100,000
question is that it captures only preferences on the risk averse domain.
Regarding the procedure in the lab experiment, directly after stating the be-
lief in the e100,000 question, the advisor’s belief in the HL-lottery is elicited.
Advisors have to answer in which exact row the presented advisee first chose
option B. Both questions of risk elicitation have to be answered directly after
the sociodemographic information or the picture is presented to the advisor.
The beliefs formed in both measures are comparable as they are formed on the
same advisees.
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5.2 Self-assessment and Beliefs
Figure 7 shows the distributions of the advisor’s beliefs and the advisor’s own
risk preferences as in section 4.1. In contrast to the e100,000 measure, the
HL-measure allows to reveal risk-loving preferences. Approximately 12.6% of
the advisors switch from lottery A to lottery B before row 5 and therefore ex-
hibit risk-loving behavior. These results are comparable in size with the results
reported by Holt and Laury (2002).
In general, we find a significant relationship between the beliefs in the HL-lottery
and the e100,000 question. The rank correlation coefficient of the beliefs in the
two measures amounts to 0.52 and is statistically significant at 0.1%. Hence, the
observed distribution of the beliefs in the HL-lottery (Figure 7) is comparable
to the distribution of the beliefs in the e100,000 question (Figure 4).
In Figure 4 we find that advisors judge the advisees to be less risk tolerant com-
pared to their own risk attitude in the RANK and PAY treatment. This result
is detected in the robustness check as well since the dashed lines lie above the
solid black line, as can be observed in Figure 7. A sign-test approves this result
at a significance level of 1%. 72% of advisors’ beliefs are less risky or equally
risky compared to the advisors own risk preferences. Furthermore a Wilcoxon
test does not detect any difference between SELF and PICT. Therefore the
statistical findings of the robustness check are in line with the results of section
4.1.
5.3 How do Advisors Form Beliefs?
In the following section we present the robustness checks for the question of
section 4.2. For this we replicate the analysis above with the HL-lottery and
re-estimate the empirical models (1) to (3) and refer to them as (1a) to (3a)
in Table 9 and 10. If we find coefficients to exhibit an opposite sign compared
to section 4.2, our results are similar, as for the HL-lottery, a higher number
indicates that the advisee is supposed to switch later and thus reveals a higher
risk aversion. Aside from the sign, the dependent variables of both risk measures
range on a scale from 0 to 10.
For model (1a), which analyzes the specification of (1), we find similar effects.
Again the risk index, gender and income variables are significant at the 1%-
level. All mentioned coefficients are jointly significant at the 1%-level as well.
In model (2a) we incorporate advisors’ own risk preferences (’all advisors self’)
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in addition to the advisee fixed effects. In line with model (2a) the coefficient
is significant and of relevant magnitude.
Model (3a) includes indicator variables for the different advisors’ groups. In
model (3) we find no false consensus effect for the junior advisors. In contrast
to that, in model (3a) these advisors exhibit a false consensus. However it is
not statistically different from the non-professionals. The same is true for the
senior professionals.
These robustness checks largely confirm the results of chapter 4.2. We find
differences in the magnitude of the false consensus for the junior professionals.
5.4 Social Distance
As a final validation, in Table 11 we provide the robustness check for section 4.3.
In general, model (4a) shows comparable results as model (4). Especially, for
the variables of interest - the interaction terms - we find the same pattern as in
the baseline model as risk index and parenthood turn out to be significant and
comparable in size. The same result can be identified for the dummy variables
of the advisors’ groups, although the signs of the coefficients of these variables
differ.
Consistently, the baseline model and the robustness check show that sociode-
mographic differences between advisor and advisee cause a deviation of the
advisors’ beliefs from their own risk attitudes.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates how advisors form beliefs about the risk preferences
of advisees. Advice, especially in the financial sector, is important as people
increasingly make their investment decisions after consulting a professional ad-
visor. Hence, an accurate prediction of an advisee’s risk preferences is vital for
good advice. The results of this study contribute to the existing literature in
several ways.
We find that the risk tolerance an advisor assigns to an advisee significantly
depends on the advisee’s self-assessment of risk preferences. Besides, the self-
assessment, gender and income have a significant impact on the advisors’ as-
sessment of the advisees’ risk preferences. A salient finding is that advisors
employ their own risk preferences as a reference point when giving advice.
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Interestingly, the beliefs show a higher risk aversion than the advisors’ own risk
preferences. For the process of giving advice this indicates that - abstracting
from any incentive problems arising in the advice process - advisors in general
do not assess people to be more risky than they are themselves.
As a result of our analysis we find that advisors update their beliefs on the
advisee’s risk preferences according to their social distance to the advisee. If
advisors’ and avisees exhibit a different parenthood status or risk index, the
advisor’ beliefs deviate significantly from their own risk attitude which we in-
terpret as an updating process. When analyzing the prediction errors we find
that more available information reduces prediction errors. Especially the visi-
bility of the risk index and family status improves the prediction. By using the
large-scale data of the SOEP to construct choices of representative advisees,
we provide further robustness for this result. Sociodemographic information is
helpful for advice to become more precise. Good advice is thus not cheap, it
needs sociodemographic information. Information about family status and the
advisees’ self-assessment of risk preferences, however, can be obtained easily in
a counseling interview.
The fact that professional advisors are able to predict the risk preference with
higher precision is good news for costumers of financial advisors. Furthermore,
theoretical studies that solely focus on agency problems and incentives that
arise in the counseling interview often take as given that the advisor is aware
of the risk preferences of the advisee. Given our study, this assumption should
be viewed with some caution.
A major asset of this study is the rich dataset. We investigate whether the
financial professionals’ behavior differs from non-professionals. Interestingly,
junior professionals emerge as a group that stands out for two reasons. First,
their advice is less dependent on their own risk preferences, and second, the
prediction is more precise than in any other group. Hence, extensive counseling
experience does not necessarily lead to a better outcome in terms of prediction
accuracy.
The presented results are fairly robust as the additional analysis with the mea-
sure of Holt and Laury shows.
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A Materials: Robustness Check
A.1 Risk measure: HL-lottery
Figure 6: sMPL Mechanism (HL-lottery)
A.2 Self-assessment and Beliefs
Figure 7: Advisors’ Choices in Treatments (HL-lottery)
A.3 Belief formation
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Table 9: Regression Results: Belief Formation in HL-lottery
Model (1a) (2a) (3a)
dependent variable HL HL HL
1
{s
ee
n
=
1
}
Year of birth0 13.95 15.22 15.22
13.79 13.35 13.09
No uni degree -0.12 -0.272* -0.267*
0.187 0.164 0.161
Single -0.16 -0.179 -0.197
0.192 0.164 0.165
Low income 0.0865 0.047 0.0399
0.149 0.143 0.142
Male -0.246 -0.232 -0.203
0.164 0.142 0.142
No children -0.177 -0.155 -0.12
0.161 0.144 0.145
Risk index0 1.563*** 1.666*** 1.666***
0.216 0.2 0.202
1
{s
ee
n
=
1
}·
{s
oc
d
em
6=0
}
Year of birth -0.00725 -0.00785 -0.00785
-0.00697 -0.00676 -0.00662
Uni degree 0.123 0.27 0.262
-0.196 -0.182 -0.178
Partner 0.24 0.253 0.275
-0.199 -0.18 -0.176
Female 0.706*** 0.643*** 0.644***
-0.131 -0.12 -0.12
High income -0.636*** -0.613*** -0.636***
-0.215 -0.212 -0.206
Parenthood 0.291 0.297 0.286
-0.204 -0.195 -0.197
Risk index -0.406*** -0.426*** -0.427***
-0.073 -0.0654 -0.0652
R
is
k
p
re
fs
se
lf Self 0.397*** 0.349***
0.0558 0.066
Self· junior -0.0324
0.126
Self· senior 0.183
0.127
Junior prof. 0.0235 0.198 0.384
0.203 0.181 0.920
Senior prof. -0.661** -0.467* -1.647*
0.324 0.267 0.947
Rank 0.02 0.0395 0.0326
0.0863 0.0838 0.083
Constant 6.916*** 4.082*** 4.404***
0.264 0.454 0.529
N 1,336 1,336 1,336
R2 0.23 0.353 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.341 0.347
Advisee FE yes yes yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered at advisors’ level. Dependent variable:
advisor’s belief in HL-lottery. 1{seen = 1} indicates a characteristic is visible. {soc dem} indicates the
realization of the characteristic. The left-out category is 1{seen = 0}.
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Table 10: Wald Test on Joint Significance (P-values) of Coefficients in Table 9
Model (1) (2) (3)
H0 : {socdem = 0}+ {socdem 6= 0}=0
Year of Birth 0.256 0.256 0.247
Education 0.988 0.988 0.971
Family status 0.647 0.647 0.625
Income 0.014 0.014 0.009
Gender 0.003 0.003 0.002
Parenthood 0.460 0.460 0.378
Risk index 0.000 0.000 0.000
A.4 Does Sociodemographic Distance Matter?
Table 11: Regression Results: Social Distance in HL-lottery
Model (4a)
dependent variable HL: |belief -self|
|ad
v
is
o
r
-
a
d
v
is
ee
|·
1
{s
ee
n
=
1
}
Year of birth 0.00631
0.00484
Education -0.071
0.131
Partner 0.0772
0.131
High income -0.122
0.129
Gender 0.0769
0.101
Children 0.260*
0.140
Risk index 0.169***
0.0199
Junior prof. 0.221**
0.0919
Senior prof. 0.500***
0.101
Rank -0.0626
0.082
Constant 1.302***
0.117
Observations 1,336
R2 0.110
Seen dummy yes
Advisee FE yes
Results of Random effects model, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, dependent variable: absolute difference
between advisor’s belief and advisor’s own risk preferences.
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For Online Publication only
B Instructions of Web Survey
Regarding this survey: Please try to answer all questions. If you do not know
an answer or if you prefer not answer a question please skip it.
General Questions
• Please state: Year of birth, Federal state of birth, Gender, Mother tongue,
Nationality, Religion
• Please state: Do you speak other languages? If so, which?
• Family status: (Please choose: single, divorced, partnership, live sepa-
rated, married, widowed)
• Number of children: (Please choose: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more, none)
Education
• Highest school degree: (Please choose: Abitur, Realschule, Hauptschule,
Sonderschule, no school graduation)
• Please state: How many years have been in school till your highest degree?
• Education: (Please choose: University, Advanced training, Training, in
training, no training)
• State the name/title of your last training:
• Job: (Please choose: Worker, Employee, Employee in public sector, Civil
Servant, in education/training, self-employed, working at my own house-
hold, unemployed, disabled, other)
• Working time: (Please choose: full-time, half-time, part-time but less
than half-time, not working)
• Last executed job (Please state):
• Monthly net income: (Please choose: up toe1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-
e6,000, over e6,001)
• Do you own: (Please choose: Bonds, Properties, Security funds, Stocks
or derivatives)
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Lotteries
Lottery 1
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table
you can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two
lotteries. Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B).
Consider the first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2
with a probability of 10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If
you imagine a ten-sided-dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled
a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B
you will receive e3.85 with a probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability
of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you
receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
Please decide whether you would choose Option A or Option B in each of the
10 rows:
Lottery 2
Please now consider that it is not possible for you to answer the lottery. You
ask a close confidant to make the following decision for you. On your behalf, the
close confidant is asked to name the preferred option in every row. Please remind
yourself of the persons image and name. You are not able to communicate with
your close confident, you are not able to inform him/her about your decision.
What do you thing, how would this close confident take the decisions in the
following lottery?
Again you find the same table as before in which we ask you for 10 decisions.
As before, you can either choose Option A or Option B. You make your decision
by crossing the option in the column “Your choice”.
Which relationship do you have with the person (e.g., partner, friend, relative
etc.)?
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Other Questions
People can behave differently in different situations.
How would you describe yourself? Are you a risk-loving person or do you try
to avoid risks? People behave differently in different areas. How would you
assess your own risk tolerance in the following areas? Please choose a number
on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes “no willingness to take risks” and 10
indicates “very high risk-tolerance”. You can gradate you assessment with the
values in between. You risk tolerance?
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In financial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
Another question regarding your risk preferences:
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after
you collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the condi-
tions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is
equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the
opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer.
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What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this
financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
What is your opinion on the following three statements?
• On the whole one can trust people (Please choose: Totally Agree, agree
slightly, slightly disagree, Disagree Totally)
• Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone (Please choose: Totally Agree, agree
slightly, slightly disagree, Disagree Totally)
• If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can
trust them (Please choose: Totally Agree, agree slightly, slightly disagree,
Disagree Totally)
Would you say that for most of the time, people (Please choose on of
the two possibilities)
• attempt to be helpful?
• or only act in their own interests?
Do you believe that most people (Please choose on of the two possibilities)
• would exploit you if they had the opportunity
• or would attempt to be fair towards you?
What would you say: How many close friends do you have?
How often does it occur that,
• that you lend your friends your personal belongings (i.e. CDs, books, car,
bicycle)? (Please choose: Very Often, Often, Sometime, Seldom, Never)
• that you lend your friends money? (Please choose: Very Often, Often,
Sometime, Seldom, Never)
• that you leave the door to your apartment unlocked? (Please choose: Very
Often, Often, Sometime, Seldom, Never)
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C Instructions of Lab Experiment
Please note:
• Comments to the instructions are printed in italic and were not presented
to the subjects.
• A horizontal line indicates whenever a new window was presented to ad-
visors.
• To ease orientation, treatments as mentioned in the paper are identified
by TREATMENT X.
Instructions of the Lab Experiment:
Goal and Process of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a total of two phases, in each of which you will have
to make decisions. In the first phase we will ask you a number of questions and
you will make two decisions. In the second phase of the experiment you will
make the same set of decisions for other people and your payment will depend
on the accuracy of your decisions.
The e2.65 that you receive for you participation can be used during the ex-
periment - more on that later. You can make money with every decision you
make. We will inform you about your compensation in every round as well as
your total compensation for the entire experiment only after the completion
of the experiment.
TREATMENT SELF
Basic Information
Please answer the following general questions. The success of the experiment
depends on you answering the questions carefully.
General Information
• Year of Birth:
• Height in cm:
• Gender: (please choose: male/ female)
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• Marital Status: (please choose: Single, Divorced, In a relationship, Living
Separately, Married, Widowed)
• How many children do you have?: (please choose: no children, one child,
two children, three children, four children, five or more children)
• Enter your highest level of education: (please choose: University, Techni-
cal College, Apprenticeship, Currently a student, Completed Economics
Major, Currently an Economics Major, No vocational education)
• What is your current occupation?: (please choose: white-collar employee,
white-collar civil servant, blue-collar employee, blue-collar civil servant,
civil servant with tenure, student, self-employed, working at home, unable
to work, unemployed, other)
• What are your current working hours?: (please choose: full-time, half-
time, part-time (less than halftime), not employed)
• What is your monthly net income in Euro?: (please choose: Up to e1,000,
e1,001 - e3,000, e3,001 - e6,000, over e6,000)
How would you describe yourself?
Are you a risk-loving person or do you try to avoid risks?
People behave differently in different areas. How would you assess your own
risk tolerance in the following areas?
Please choose a number on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes ”risk averse”
and 10 indicates ”fully prepared to take risks”. You can gradate you assessment
with the values in between.
You risk tolerance?
• In general? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• Concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In financial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
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Game Decision I
We will now begin with the first game decision. Please read the instructions
carefully; it is very important that you understand the question.
Game Decision I
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after
you collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the condi-
tions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is
equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the
opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer.
What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this
financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Compensation
In terms of your actual compensation, the e100,000 are equivalent to e2.50
(e80,000 correspond to e2 , etc.). Your chosen amount will be entered into
the lottery; the computer draws lots to see if you double or half your wagered
amount.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
Game Decision II
The second game decision is up next. Please read the instructions carefully.
Take your time. It is very important that you thoroughly understand the ques-
tion, since this question will be repeated in different variations throughout the
rest of the experiment.
Game decision II
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table
you can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two
lotteries. Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B).
Consider the first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2
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with a probability of 10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If
you imagine a ten-sided-dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled
a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B
you will receive e3.85 with a probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability
of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you
receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
There are two rational strategies in this game:
• you choose Option A at the beginning before switching to Option B for
the rest of the rows
• you choose Option B for all of the rows
We are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B below the table. If you
only choose Option B, please enter a 1.
Your Compensation
A random row will be chosen for your actual Euro-payment. Your chosen option
will be applied to this row. The realization of either the higher or the lower
payment for a certain option will be chosen randomly. If the seventh row is
chosen for example and you have decided on option A, you will receive e2 with
a 70% probability and e1.60 with a 30% probability.
Your Decision
I choose option B the first time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
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By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your profit and your compensation will be revealed at the end of
the experiment.
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TREATMENT RANK
In this section you are supposed to estimate how other people decided in the
Game Decisions that you have just made. The better your estimation, the
higher your compensation will be. You will receive some information about the
persons whose decision behavior you are trying to predict.
It is important to understand what information is subsumed in certain charac-
teristics. Please carefully read the characteristics and the possible manifesta-
tions of these characteristics.
The following characteristics are available:
1. Age
2. Level of Education
• University
• Technical College
• Apprenticeship
• Still in Apprenticeship
• Currently an Economics Major
• No vocational education
3. Income (current monthly net income)
• Up to e1,000
• e1,001-e3,000
• e3,001-e6,000
• over e6,000
4. Marital Status
• Single
• Divorced
• In a relationship
• Living Separately
• Married
• Widowed
5. Gender
• Male
• Female
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6. Children
• Has children
• Has no children
7. Risk disposition concerning financial investments
• Answer to the question: Are you risk-loving when it comes to finan-
cial investments or do you try to avoid financial risks? Please choose
a number on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes ”risk averse”
and a 10 indicates ”fully prepared to take risks”.
You will only have to assess how a single person decided in the two Game Deci-
sions, so you will have to evaluate a specific person. You are paid according to
the accuracy of your assessment. If you correctly assess how the presented per-
son acted in both decisions, you will receive e0.50 for every correct prediction.
In order to make your assessment, you will make the decisions you previously
made for yourself for the specific person instead.
The information available for assessing the person will consist of a selection of
the seven characteristics presented above. You will not receive all seven of the
person’s characteristics. Instead, we will generate a random number between
1 and 7 that corresponds with the number of revealed characteristics. If the
randomly generated number is a 3, for example, you will receive the first three
characteristics of the person that you are assessing.
You can now decide which characteristic you want to assign to the first position,
the second position, all the way to the seventh position. Make you decisions
carefully; characteristics with a higher position are revealed with a higher prob-
ability.
Your Decision
Sort the characteristics by clicking and dragging the characteristics to the po-
sitions you want them in.
The characteristic at the top of the list has the highest prioritization; the second
characteristic has the second-highest characterization etc.
Note: The characteristics are presented in alphabetic order
• Level of Education
• Income category
• Marital Status
• Year of Birth
• Gender
• Has Children
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• Risk disposition concerning financial investments
This window appeared 4 times with differing number of characteristics shown
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics: Since x was drawn as the random
number you receive the first x of the characteristics that you had chosen for the
person that you are assessing.
• ...
• ...
Game Decision I
What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game’s
second round? Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We
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are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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TREATMENT PAY
This and the following window appeared 4 times.
How do you assess other people?
In this round you will have to assess four other people again. As in the previous
round, you will be given a selection of the seven characteristics shown above
to help facilitate your decision-making process. This time, however, you can
choose which of the characteristics of the person you are assessing you want to
have revealed. You have to pay for every revealed characteristic.
As you can garner from the table below, the costs of the characteristics vary.
The first characteristic costs e0.01, die second e0.02 etc. The seventh charac-
teristic costs e0.50. The right-hand column of the table displays the total costs.
If you want to see all seven characteristics of the person you are assessing, for
example, you will be charged e0.99.
Cost of Characteristic Total cost
1. Characteristic e0.01 e0.01
2. Characteristic e0.02 e0.03
3. Characteristic e0.03 e0.06
4. Characteristic e0.06 e0.12
5. Characteristic e0.12 e0.24
6. Characteristic e0.25 e0.49
7. Characteristic e0.50 e0.99
Your compensation is as follows:
Compensation for Game Decision I + Compensation for Game Deci-
sion II - Payment for Characteristics
As in the previous round you will receive e0.50 for Game Decision 1 and e0.50
for Game Decision 2 if your assessment proves to be correct.
The costs of buying certain characteristics will be subtracted from your com-
pensation. If, for example, your assessment for Game Decision I is correct and
your evaluation for Game Decision II is not and you have bought three charac-
teristics, you will receive (e0.50 + e0 -e0.06 =e0.44).
Please note: Since you have winnings from previous rounds and the e2.65 that
we put at your disposal at the beginning of the game, your total compensation
cannot be negative.
Please decide on the characteristics that you want to buy now:
• Age
• Level of Education
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• Income
• Marital Status
• Gender
• Children
• Risk disposition concerning financial investments
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics:
You have bought x characteristics. The person you are supposed to assess has
the following characteristics:
• ...
• ...
Game Decision I
What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game’s
second round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
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DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We
are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row:
(Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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TREATMENT PICT
This window appeared 4 times for picture number 1,2,3,4.
How do you assess other people?
In this round you will assess four different persons. You will receive a picture
of the person you are assessing in order to help you make your decision.
We have placed a brown envelope (C4 format) on your seat. The envelope con-
tains a sheet with four pictures. Please consider picture number X.
Game Decision I:
What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s deci-
sion, you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I
would decline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person above above made in the game’s second
round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the person above, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the person above decision,
you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person above made. We are inter-
ested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please specify the
row in which you will first choose Option B.
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The person chooses Option B for the first time in row:
(Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
55
Questions
Please answer the following questions.
Note: The questions refer to the entire experiment.
1. Do you know one of the persons on the pictures? If yes, which one(s)?
2. Which of the people on the pictures would you trust most with you money?
Please indicate a picture number.
3. Do you think that the provided information was sufficient? What ad-
ditional information about the individuals you assessed would you have
liked to have had?
4. Do you generally believe that it is possible to evaluate the decisions of
other people?
5. Were you more confident making you assessments on the basis of the
picture or of the profile (with the characteristics)?
6. Did you have a certain strategy in making your assessments? If yes, please
describe briefly.
7. When you think back to your last counseling session at your bank, did you
have the feeling that you counselor could assess your preferences/wishes
well?
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot edit your answers
afterwards.
Your compensation
Calculation of your compensation
You total payment comprises the compensation for every single round.
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Basic amount ex
Part 1
Game Decision 1 ex
Game Decision 2 ex
Part 2
Pre-survey Assessment Game Decision I ex
Game Decision II ex
Part 3
Ordering Characteristics Round 1: ex
Round 2: ex
Round 3: ex
Round 4 ex
Buying Round 1: ex
Purchase Price: ex
Round 2: ex
Purchase Price: ex
Round 3: ex
Purchase Price: ex
Round 4 ex
Purchase Price: ex
Pictures Round 1: ex
Round 2: ex
Round 3: ex
Round 4 ex
Total Compensation ex
Payment Procedure
We will make the payments according to your ID (identification number)
You will find a receipt among the documents in front of you. Please enter your
total compensation, your ID, and selected other information in the acknowledg-
ment form.
Important: Do not close the browser window. Raise your hand as soon as you
are finished.
Thank you for your participation
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